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control problem via backward induction on Markov chains was devel-
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1. Introduction
This report draws from Krawczyk (2006). It also provides some technical remarks on the use of
the new routines constituting NISOCSol.
In Krawczyk & Tidball (2006) a finite horizon unconstrained dynamic game was solved through
backward induction. At each stage, a Markovian (feedback-Nash) equilibrium was computed
as a solution to a system of the Bellman equations where each Bellman equation characterised
a player’s value function. Due to the lack of constraints, the computations were rather straight-
forward albeit sensitive to the horizon length.
The backward induction technique will be also applied in this paper. However, instead of
simultaneous maximisation of the players’ value functions (as in Krawczyk & Tidball (2006)),
constrained min-maximisation of the stage Nikaidoˆ-Isoda function will be performed with
each player’s value function characterised by their Bellman equation. This method appears
satisfactory in the constrained dynamic game context.
In this paper, some background on Markovian (feedback-Nash) solutions is given in Section 2.
The technical remarks of Section 3 explain how a feedback solution to a dynamic game can be
obtained.
2. Markovian (Feedback-Nash) Equilibrium
2.1. Preliminaries. Denote the game value (Bellman function) for player i from state x(τ) at
time τ by the payoff-to-go1 function Fi(x
(τ);u):
(1) F
(τ)
i
(x(τ);u) =
T−1∑
t=τ
ρt
(
φi(x
(t)) − c3,i(u
(t)
i
)2
)
+ ρTk(x
(T)
i
)
when the players are using strategy u = [u1, u2, u3]. Here, φi(·) is the static (concave) payoff for
player i contingent on full utilisation of production capacity, c3,i(·)
2 is a quadratic investment
cost†, k(·) is the capacity’s scrap value function and ρ the discount factor.
Definition 1. We say that strategies u∗
1
,u∗
2
,u∗
3
constitute a feedback-Nash (or Markovian
subgame-perfect) equilibrium on IR3+ if:
(i) They are admissible at any x(t) ∈ IR3+, and
1Or continuation payoff.
†Payoff concavity and a quadratic investment cost are not crucial for the method - weak convex-concavity of the
Nikaidoˆ-Isoda function suffices.
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(ii) For any history x(τ), x(τ+1), . . . , x(t) and for any admissible (ui,u
∗
−i
), i = 1, 2, 3 the following
inequalities hold:
F
(t)
i
(x(t);u∗) ≥ F
(t)
i
(x(t);ui,u
∗
−i), i = 1, 2, 3.(2)
Here:
(3) u
(t)
i
= ui(x
(t), t)
and each strategy is a map:
(4)
ui
R3+ × T =⇒ R i = 1, 2, 3
∈ ∈
(x(t), t) u
(t)
i
t ∈ {0, . . . ,T − 1} ≡ T
The symbol u−i will be used to represent the other players’ strategies.
So, we wish to solve problem (2) for strategies (3).
2.2. A solution method.
2.2.1. Stage-dependent Nikaidoˆ-Isoda functions. Acoupled-constraint game is a difficult construct.
A solution concept suitable for this type of game is a “generalised”Nash equilibrium (seeArrow
& Debreu (1954), McKenzie (1959), Rosen (1965), Hobbs & Pang (2006), Contreras et al. (2004),
Haurie & Krawczyk (1997), Krawczyk & Uryasev (2000), Krawczyk (2005b)). A numerical
approachmay be necessary to obtain such a general solution - this was the case for a static game
solved in Krawczyk & Zuccollo (2006), and also for the open-loop game of Krawczyk (2005b).
For Markovian games, a solution consists of strategies understood as maps rather than time
profiles. The latter may also be obtained for Markovian games as realisations of strategies in
form of (4).
SOCSol4L (see Azzato & Krawczyk (2006); also e.g., Krawczyk (2001) and Krawczyk (2005a))
is a suite of MATLABR© routines capable of approximating optimal strategies to intertemporal
decision problems having a single planner2. Hence, SOCSol4L can rather straightforwardly be
used to approximate the Pareto optimal strategies.
2I.e., SOCSol4L solves optimal control problems.
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Here we explain the usage of SOCSol4L to compute feedback-Nash equilibrium strategies. In
this case, the solution strategies will be maximisers of the Nikado-Isoda functions formulated
stage-by-stage from the players’ value functions Fi(x
(τ);u) (see (1)) and iterated backward in
time3. The equilibrium solution (also, equilibrium existence, uniqueness and the algorithm
convergence) will be contingent upon the stageNikado-Isoda functions’ weak convex-concavity
and the constraint set’s convexity. These can be verified.
In practical terms, to solve a dynamic game (2) in admissible feedback strategies (3) we need to
combine results of the Convergence Theorem (see e.g., Krawczyk & Uryasev (2000), Krawczyk
(2005b)) with the Bellman optimality principle. The use of optimality principle implies that
stage gameswill be solved backward in time. Hence, the Convergence Theorem will be applied
at each stage (backward in time) with the role of a “one-off” (or static) utility being played by
the utility-to-go F
(t)
i
(x(t);u).
2.2.2. StageGames. LetU
(t)
(−i)
denote the i th player’s strategy set at time t. In a coupled-constraint
context, this set depends on the other players’ strategies (indicated by the subscript (−i)). It
follows from Section 2.1 that:
U
(t)
(−1)
∪ U
(t)
(−2)
∪ U
(t)
(−3)
= U(t) ⊂ IR3
Assume that f (i)(x(t),u
(t)
i
) and k(x(T)) are concave, with:
(5) f (i)(x(t),u
(t)
i
) = φi(x
(t)) − c3,i(u
(t)
i
)2 , f
(i)
T
(x
(T)
i
) = ki(x
(T)
i
)
Define V
(t)
i
(x(t)), an optimal value function for player i at stage t, by:
V
(t)
i
(x(t)) = max
u
(t)
i
∈U
(t)
(−i)
F
(t)
i
(x(t);u
(t)
i
,u−i(x
(t), t)), t = T − 1, . . . , 1, 0(6)
V
(i)
T
(x(T),T) = f
(i)
T
(xTi )(7)
where:
(8) F
(t)
i
(x(t);u
(t)
i
,u−i(x
(t), t)) ≡ f (i)(x(t),u
(t)
i
) + ̺V
(t+1)
i
(x(t+1))
3The dynamic game at hand is finite horizon.
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The following theorem4 establishes a basis for using dynamic programming as a computational
technique for Markovian (feedback-Nash) equilibria in dynamic games.
Theorem 1. If there exist value functions V
(t)
i
(x(t)) and strategies ui(x
(t), t) which satisfy equations (6),
(8) and (7) for t = T − 1, . . . 1, 0, where x(t) is a vector of state variables observable at t, then the strategy:
u∗ = (u∗i ,u
∗
−i)
constitutes aMarkovian (feedback-Nash) equilibrium for the dynamic game under a feedback information
pattern5. Moreover, the value functions V
(t)
i
(x(t)) represent player i’s optimal utility for the game starting
at (x(t), t). In particular:
(9) V
(0)
i
(x(0)) = Φi(x
(0);u∗)
If each stage game F
(·)
i
,F
(·)
−i
is concave, then it makes sense to ask whether the stage games have
unique equilibria. We observe that at least the last game “played” to maximise the utility-to-go
functions F
(T−1)
i
,F
(T−1)
−i
is concave. This is necessary for the game’s solution. Weak convex-
concavity of the Nikaidoˆ-Isoda functions for stage games (or diagonal strict concavity of these
games) can be established stage-wise backward in time to demonstrate solution uniqueness.
Notice that in equilibrium:
V
(t)
i
(x(t)) = F
(t)
i
(x(t);u∗), i = 1, 2, 3, t = T − 1, . . . , 1, 0
Hence, if player i played strategy vi while the rest were playing u
∗, then:
F
(t)
i
(x(t);vi|u
∗) ≤ F
(t)
i
(x(t);u∗), i = 1, 2, 3, t = T − 1, . . . , 1, 0
However, if u is not an equilibrium, then player i might improve his or her utility-to-go by
playing the strategy vi (given that the other players play u). Consequently, the expression:
(10) ψ
(t)
i
(u,v) = F
(t)
i
(x(t);vi|u) − F
(t)
i
(x(t);u), t = T − 1, . . . , 0
4“Standard” in dynamic games, see Bas¸ar & Olsder (1982), Theorem 6.6, pp. 284-285.
5Such an equilibrium is subgame perfect.
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might be positive. This suggests that we can define a stage Nikaidoˆ-Isoda function whose
maximisation will reveal the equilibrium u∗ under certain concavity conditions of F
(t)
i
(· ;u), t =
T − 1, . . . , 1, 0, i = 1, 2, 3.
Define the stage Nikadoˆ-Isoda function at state x(t) by:
(11) Ψx(t) : U(t) ×U(t) → IR : (u,v) 7→
3∑
i=1
(
F
(t)
i
(x(t);vi|u) − F
(t)
i
(x(t);u)
)
, t = T − 1, . . . , 1, 0
Obviously:
(12) Ψx(t)(u,u) ≡ 0, u ∈ U(t)
Each summand in (11) can be thought of as the improvement in the player’s value function that
he (or she) will receive by changing his (or her) strategy from ui to vi while all other players
continue to playu−i. TheNikaidoˆ-Isoda function thus represents the sumof these value function
improvements. Note that itsmaximum for a given u is always non-negative as a consequence of
(12). Moreover, (11) is non-positive everywhere when either u or v is a Markovian equilibrium
strategy, for in an equilibrium situation no player can unilaterally improve their payoff, and so
in this case each summand is at most zero.
From here, we conclude that when the Nikaidoˆ-Isoda function (11) cannot be made (signifi-
cantly) positive at each stage for a given u, we have (approximately) reached the Markovian
equilibrium point. This observation is useful in constructing a termination condition for our
algorithm: choose an ε > 0 such that the equilibrium has been reached to a sufficient degree of
precision when maxv∈UΨ
x(t)(us,v) < ε, where us ∈ U is computed at the current iteration s.
More formally, we shall compute a “normalised” Markovian equilibrium which will be a Nash
equilibrium under weak convex-concavity ofΨx(t)(u,v).
Definition 2. We call an admissible strategy u∗ ∈ U aNash normalised Markovian equilibrium if:
(13) max
v∈U
Ψx(t)(u∗,v) = 0
A Nash normalised Markovian equilibrium u∗ is a unique feedback-Nash equilibrium if:
• (∀t) Ψx(t)(u,v) is weakly convex-concave, or
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• (∀t)
∑n
i=1 F
(t)
i
(x(t);u) is diagonally strictly concave (see Krawczyk & Tidball (2006),
where this feature was examined in a dynamic game).
3. Numerical results through NISOCSol
This section should be read in conjunction with Azzato & Krawczyk (2006), where the calls to
SOCSol4L are explained. Here, we explain the differences that the user should be familiar with
in order to be able to call NISOCSol.
3.1. State and time discretisation. These are organised in the same way as for SOCSol4L.
3.2. Options. In this version of NISOCSol, it is assumed that eachplayer has only onedimension
of control. Consequently, the control dimension should be set to the number of players.
3.3. User defined .m functions. The utility functions for NISOCSol return values for the i th
player, where i is passed as an argument following those standard for SOCSol4L. If the game is
defined as discrete-timewith times 0,∆, 2∆, . . . ,T, where T is a multiple of∆, then the following
should also be observed:
• TimeStep = ones(1, T
∆
)/T
∆
;
• The return value of the instantaneous cost function needs to be multplied by T
∆
.
• The return value of the motion (or “delta”) function needs to be multplied by T
∆
.
With these modifications a typical NISOCSol call has the form:
NISOCSol(‘DeltaFunctionFile’, ‘InstantaneousCostFunctionFile’,
‘TerminalStateFunctionFile’, StateLB, StateUB, StateStep, TimeStep,
‘ProblemFile’, Options, InitialControlValue, A, b, Aeq, beq, ControlLB,
ControlUB, ‘UserConstraintFunctionFile’);
3.4. A test: a static equilibrium obtained as feedback-Nash. The static solution of the River
Basin Pollution game has been cited in many publications (e.g., (Krawczyk & Uryasev (2000),
Krawczyk (2005b) and Krawczyk & Zuccollo (2006)). The unique coupled-constraint equilib-
rium is:
x∗ = (21.14, 16.03, 2.73)
We will use this problem to test NISOCSol.
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Presumably, with no investment cost and no depreciation, agents should move to this equilib-
rium from any “initial condition” in one step. So we set the following parameter values: T = 1,
c3,i ≡ 0, ρ = 1, ki(·) ≡ φi(x). Furthermore, we assume the following system dynamics:
(14) x
(t+1)
i
= (1 − µi)x
(t)
i
+ u
(t)
i
As there is no depreciation, µi ≡ 0. We assume that:
(15) φi(x) = [d1 − d2(x1 + x2 + x3)]xi︸                        ︷︷                        ︸
Revenue
− (c1,i + c2,ixi)xi︸          ︷︷          ︸
Cost
The economic constants d1 and d2 determine an inverse demand law. We assign them the
respective values 3 and 0.01. The values of the cost function coefficients c1,i and c2,i and the
other model parameters are given in Table 1 below.
Player i c1,i c2,i ei δi,1 δi,2
1 0.10 0.01 0.50 6.5 4.583
2 0.12 0.05 0.25 5.0 6.250
3 0.15 0.01 0.75 5.5 3.750
Table 1. Constants for the River Basin Pollution game
The fourth column of Table 1 gives the emission parameters and the fifth gives the pollution
transportation & decay parameters that govern contamination levels at location ℓ = 1, 2. The
local authority imposes pollution constraints:
(16) qℓ(x) =
3∑
i=1
δi,ℓeixi ≤ Kℓ, ℓ = 1, 2
We take K1 = K2 = 100.
Given this information and recalling the comments in Subsections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, the following
functions were defined after Azzato & Krawczyk (2006):
Delta(u, x, t)
Costi(u, x, t, i)
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Termi(x, i)
Constraints(u, x, ts)
The programme’s output is the null strategy for x(0) = x∗ - see Figure 1, which shows strategies
at t = 0. Players’ actions u1,u2 and u3 are each plotted (from left to right) as functions of the
third, second and first state variables. We see that the feedback strategies intersect with the
horizontal axis (i.e., no action) for the initial condition x∗.
The strategy realisations are the state and action time profiles shown in Figure 2. The solid
lines (which are constant in time) demonstrate that no changes are made when given x(0) = x∗.
The dash-dotted lines show that the equilibrium point is achieved from an arbitrary initial state
(here, (22, 15, 4)).
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Figure 1. One-step Markovian equilibrium strategies.
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Figure 2. One-step Markovian equilibrium states and actions.
Lagrange multiplier rules have also been computed. To ensure that the standards (16) are
obeyed, the government needs to inform the players what taxes would be collected should
the pollution levels be exceeded. Under the feedback information pattern, the value of the
Lagrange multipliers is a function of states [x
(t)
1
, x
(t)
2
, x
(t)
3
] (here, t = 0). See Figure 3.
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Figure 3. Lagrange multipliers at t = 0 as a function of state.
4. Concluding Remarks
This report outlines a set of useful machinery for the study dynamic games (possibly) subject to
coupled-constraints (typical of environmental management problems). In particular, we have
seen how the Nikaidoˆ-Isoda function can be utilised to find a coupled-constraint equilibrium
through an optimisation approach.
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